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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a new account of administrative law, favoring
private ordering over state-imposed solutions, has bolstered the ac-
ceptability of negotiated approaches to regulatory problems.1 Consis-
tent with this account, administrative law has seen a growing trend
toward flexible, consensual mechanisms for regulation,2 emphasizing
less rigid, cooperative approaches over prolonged adversarial dis-
putes. Procedural innovations, such as negotiated regulation (known
less formally as “reg neg”), have proliferated as alternatives to more
traditional administrative procedures, such as notice and comment
rulemaking. Reformers’ embrace of such solutions for their promise
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1. Conceptually, the tension revealed in this debate is not new, as it reflects the long-
standing effort to reconcile public and private interests in the administrative state. See Louis L.
Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 203 (1937) (observing that powers
exercised by majorities of groups not only often are binding on the entire group, but also indi-
rectly affect the rest of the public).
2. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRAN-
SCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (1992) (proposing that the interplay between pri-
vate and public regulation creates the best public policy results, as opposed to either strict
regulation or total deregulation); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1997) (embracing a normative model of collaborative govern-
ance); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for
Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 445 (2000) (eyeing skeptically a widespread
shift in favor of collaborative approaches that empower stakeholders).
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in promoting private consensus over public mandate has engendered
much discussion in the literature.3
This Essay addresses the type of private ordering relating to the
settlement of lawsuits challenging administrative rules or final agency
actions, also known as “rulemaking settlements.” Hardly a procedural
innovation, the prospect of settlement is a traditional component of
any strategy to influence agency decisionmaking. Rulemaking settle-
ment is not only a private strategy, but also may serve as an important
vehicle for an agency to implement its policy decisions. Despite its
significance, the settlement of lawsuits is an understudied tool for im-
plementing regulatory policy.4 Settlement is certainly more common
than negotiated regulation,5 but unlike negotiated regulation it has
received scant attention in the administrative law literature. One re-
cent study describes rulemaking settlement as a “blind spot,” myste-
riously unaccounted for in both doctrinal and theoretical accounts of
administrative law.6
In an effort to bring this blind spot into view, I describe rule-
making settlements in Part I and discuss how they differ from other
collaborative governance mechanisms. Put simply, the basic process
by which such settlements are implemented does not necessarily af-
ford the same procedural protections as the routine agency rulemak-
ing process or other collaborative approaches such as negotiated
regulation. The Essay draws on a simple principal-agent structure to
illustrate how administrative agencies face strong incentives to ignore
the interests of important stakeholders—principals who otherwise
would be afforded procedural protections—presenting a principal-
agent gap in the rulemaking settlement context. This gap is widened
by the threat of private parties’ exit from settlement negotiations,
3. See infra notes 11, 18, 22, 23 (identifying sources discussing these alternatives). Of
course, not all of this commentary praises these innovations.
4. Notable studies of the phenomenon that struggle with understanding settlements
against the backdrop of agency discretion include Elizabeth Fisher & Patrick Schmidt, Seeing
the “Blind Spots” in Administrative Law: Theory, Practice, and Rulemaking Settlements in the
United States, 37 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 272 (2001); Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making
by Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241.
Many other studies express awareness of, but do not fully address, the phenomenon of rule-
making settlements. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New
Role for Courts?, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 17 (1985) (observing the shift in environmental
policymaking toward collaborative efforts not involving the courts, and thereby away from tra-
ditional judicial oversight). Wald also proposes a new role for the courts in the wake of this
shift—a role in negotiated regulations. Id.
5. See infra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
6. Fisher & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 273.
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coupled with high expected litigation costs that sometimes lead
agency litigants to make concessions on appeal that they would not
make in the context of the ordinary notice and comment process.
Part II addresses an example that raises an especially salient con-
cern for administrative law doctrine and theory: rulemaking settle-
ments against the backdrop of presidential transitions. The presiden-
tial transitions that follow elections often cause policy shifts,
sometimes even when a new administration is of the same political
party as an outgoing one. The prospect of an outgoing administra-
tion’s settlement binding an incoming president’s agency, or an in-
coming administration’s settlement undermining one or more regula-
tory initiatives of an outgoing president, is hardly a new concern.
However, the special legitimacy problem raised by settlements against
this backdrop illustrates a need for serious reflection on the proce-
dural protections in place during settlement—if indeed there are any
at all. Since private bargaining and agency concessions during settle-
ment occur largely outside of the apparatus of administrative proce-
dure, procedural protections designed to protect and promote the
public interest may readily be skirted. In negotiating settlements, an
agency will tend to afford large weight to some principals, including
the executive branch and settling parties, but little or no weight to
other key principals, including Congress.
Part III discusses some specific administrative law doctrines that,
if respected by lawyers and enforced by courts, hold promise to illu-
minate the settlement process, taking it out of the obscure corner it
occupies in administrative law circles and improving its accountabil-
ity. I argue that the principal-agent gap resulting from settlement can
best be addressed by focusing not only on the potential for exit by
private litigants, resulting in the prospect of ongoing litigation for the
agency, but on “voice” and “loyalty” as alternative mechanisms for
modifying institutional behavior. Given the private bargaining behind
a settlement or consent decree as well as the concomitant pressures
for agency bias toward only those perspectives present at the bar-
gaining table, I argue that some judicial role in protecting the public
interest is appropriate. At the same time, judicial scrutiny of settle-
ments must be balanced against preservation of private stakeholder
participation in rulemaking settlements. I advocate expansive partici-
pation in settlement processes, a type of voice interest, but argue that
this alone is not enough to ameliorate the principal-agent gap posed
by rulemaking settlement. Specifically, attention to loyalty interests—
fidelity to statutory criteria and the procedural mechanisms designed
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to protect the public interest—necessitates an ex ante hard look re-
view of a rulemaking settlement at the time that an appeal is dis-
missed, or a consent decree or stay is approved. This approach, I ar-
gue, will help to close the principal-agent gap in rulemaking
settlement and encourage better participation in settlement by private
stakeholders, while also allowing stakeholders ample opportunity to
enforce settlement terms.
I.  RULEMAKING SETTLEMENT
Agencies routinely enter into settlements limiting the scope of
their regulatory discretion. To a degree, rulemaking settlement fits
into a broader trend toward collaborative governance in the adminis-
trative state. However, the analogy between rulemaking settlement
and other collaborative governance techniques, such as negotiated
regulation, is limited. At the fore are concerns about the potential for
abuse of settlements by private stakeholders and the more general
implications for administrative legitimacy. Because settlement is most
controversial when it reflects a compromise on substantive issues of
interpretation or policy, this Essay focuses its discussion on these
types of settlements rather than on less controversial—but perhaps
more common—settlements in which the government merely agrees
to a schedule or process for rule consideration.7 Conceptually, rule-
making settlement may be more likely than negotiated regulation to
present a principal-agent gap because agency negotiators, in an ap-
pellate posture, face incentives for skirting important stakeholder
perspectives—including those that may be most concerned with safe-
guarding the public interest.
A. Settlement as a Type of Collaborative Governance
Settlement is hardly a novel concept in the administrative proc-
ess. For several years, regulators have embraced settlements and
other alternative dispute resolution techniques as fundamental com-
ponents of the administrative process. Unlike traditional litigation, al-
ternative dispute resolution provides an opportunity to deflect the
adversarial nature of many administrative proceedings, while also
empowering private stakeholders. Such techniques are touted—often
7. For discussions of these types of settlements, see Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal Rulemak-
ing by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1243–48 (1985) (examining the differences be-
tween scheduling agreements, process agreements, and substantive agreements).
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as “innovations”—for their flexibility, efficiency, and legitimacy over
more traditional administrative procedures.8
For example, it is now commonplace for an agency to offer the
opportunity for mediation and settlement to parties to an adjudica-
tion, such as an enforcement proceeding.9 Such techniques can assist
an agency in securing compliance with its regulations while also of-
fering private parties the opportunity to avoid protracted litigation.
Settlement raises little potential for controversy where it is bilateral
and between two private parties, as may be the case in a license con-
test proceeding.10 In a sense, the government is not a party to such
proceedings, although an agency may play an important role as refe-
ree in ensuring that the settlement outcome between private parties
reflects the public interest. The greater the public interest issues
raised in an agency proceeding, the more controversial settlement
may become.11
But most settlements involving administrative process are not ex-
tragovernmental. If, for example, an agency brings an enforcement
action against a private party, the dispute between the agency and the
private party is often bilateral, but the nature of the interests at stake
differs in a fundamental way from a bilateral settlement between pri-
vate negotiators. The position of a regulated party in challenging the
8. See, e.g., Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospects for Regulatory Reform: The
Legacy of Reagan’s First Term, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 308 (1985) (characterizing negotiated
regulation as “pioneering work” and an “innovation”); Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of
Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 655, 682 (as-
serting that dysfunctions in a legalistic approach to regulation can be ameliorated by encourag-
ing negotiation).
9. As of August 1, 2000, over twenty-nine federal agencies and agency components had
published proposed or final alternative dispute resolution policies or implemented pilot alterna-
tive dispute resolution programs. Marshall J. Breger, The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1996 and the Private Practitioner, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
DESKBOOK 1, 10–11 (2001). The most prominent of these programs is the Department of La-
bor’s mediation program. Id.
10. Even in the context of purely private, bilateral settlements, however, commentators
have raised concerns about the protection of public values. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Set-
tlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (suggesting that settlements are at best “a capitulation
to the conditions of mass society” and “should be neither encouraged nor praised”); David Lu-
ban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2652–53 (1995) (de-
crying in particular “secret settlements” and their threat to public values).
11. For example, when OSHA finds a violation of its regulations, it often settles it for one-
half or less of the assessed penalty. Given scarce inspection resources and limitations on
OSHA’s fining authority, this creates less than optimal incentives for compliance with work-
place safety measures. Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compli-
ance in Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 97, 108–09 (2000).
ROSSI.DOC 02/05/02  10:36 AM
1020 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1015
agency’s action and entering into negotiated solutions may be moti-
vated by private interests, but the agency is constrained (and hope-
fully motivated) by the public interest, including institutional and
procedural checks designed to ensure that this public interest is not
sacrificed. Matters become substantially more complex when private
stakeholders with divergent interests must reach consensus and nego-
tiated solutions to complex, multipolar private conflicts in addition to
accommodating the public interest.
This last scenario is perhaps most common in the context of
agency rulemaking. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)12 sets
out the basic framework for agency decisionmaking, including the no-
tice and comment rulemaking process that agencies use to make law
and policy. In the typical notice and comment procedure, an agency
will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking, allow a period for pub-
lic comment, consider comments submitted to it, and then approve
and publish a final rule.13 Judicial review of the agency’s process and
regulation is separate from, but inextricably linked to, this process.
Courts review agency regulations adopted through the rulemaking
process to determine whether they are “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”14
Since the 1970s, more expansive definitions of standing have in-
creased the number, and broadened the range, of parties allowed to
participate meaningfully in the judicial appeals process.15 Doctrinal
developments also have created more opportunities to challenge
rules, not just in as-applied enforcement proceedings but also prior to
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1994 and Supp.
IV 1998).
13. Id. § 553(b)–(c).
14. Id. § 706. As a component of such review, courts sometimes invoke the hard look test,
which is discussed infra at Part III.B.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (determining that standing should not be denied solely on the basis that
many people are injured); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152
(1970) (noting that petitioners who sold data processing services had standing under a theory of
“injury in fact”); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (demonstrating that “courts have resolved questions of standing as they
arose and have at no time manifested an intent to make economic interest and electrical inter-
ference the exclusive grounds for standing”). The rulemaking process depends on broad-based
participation for its legitimacy. For a discussion of this theory, see Jim Rossi, Participation Run
Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 173, 221–46 (1997).
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their enforcement.16 The unintended result, some suggest, is a system
of “adversarial legalism,”17 characterized by the breathtaking fre-
quency and length of judicial appeals of agency rules.18 Some see this
appeals process as dysfunctional, ossifying the rulemaking process
and detracting from sound policy formulation through rulemaking.19
Negotiated regulation, a consensus-based procedure in which
stakeholders negotiate the substance of a proposed rule, is one pro-
cedure designed to address such problems.20 In the typical negotiated
regulation, private stakeholders, along with an administrative agency,
negotiate the substance of a proposed rule, which the agency then
subjects to a more traditional notice and comment rulemaking proc-
ess. Many commentators praise negotiated regulation for its potential
advantages over traditional notice and comment rulemaking in pro-
moting the ideals of collaborative governance of the administrative
state.21 In implementing negotiated regulation, however, courts and
commentators alike struggle to create adequate incentives for private
stakeholder participation, on the one hand, while still promoting the
public interest, on the other.22
16. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967) (permitting pre-enforcement
review “where a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs' con-
duct of their affairs with serious penalties attached to noncompliance”).
17. See Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369, 375–79 (1991) (proposing that adversarial legalism creates enormous
costs to parties).
18. See CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW
AND MAKE POLICY 246 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that the “frequency of lawsuits that challenge
rules in certain agencies is breathtaking”); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise
and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1298–1301 (1997) (observing
that the percentage of rules subject to judicial review ranges from twenty-six to eighty percent
of all rules promulgated).
19. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1396 (1992) (explaining that ossification is due in part to underfunding of
agencies, but is due primarily to “underlying inertial forces” embedded in the process of infor-
mal rulemaking itself).
20. Negotiated regulation draws inspiration from the alternative dispute resolution move-
ment, which favors negotiation over more litigious approaches to resolving disputes. For a dis-
cussion of the benefits and barriers to negotiation, see ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 9–19 (2000); Joel
Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Michael Watkins, Toward a Theory of Representation in Negotiation, in
NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS 23, 23–51 (Robert H. Mnookin & Lawrence E. Susskind
eds., 1999).
21. For examples, see infra note 23 and accompanying text.
22. Well-known critiques of the implementation process include William Funk’s case study
of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) negotiated regulation and Susan Rose-Ackerman’s
conceptual exploration of the tension between incentives and consensus. William Funk, When
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Negotiated regulation holds out many advantages over the tradi-
tional notice and comment process for adopting rules. Since the nego-
tiated regulation process commences prior to the initiation of official
notice and comment procedures, parties have an early opportunity to
lessen the adversarial tone that dominates many large rulemaking
proceedings. If stakeholders can agree on a negotiated regulation
prior to agency adoption of the regulation, appeals of the final regula-
tion will be less likely. Negotiated regulation has received much dis-
cussion in the literature, with many commentators praising the tech-
nique,23 and others raising concerns with the strong potential for
interest group domination of the process.24 At its worst, negotiated
regulation can subvert the public interest to the extent that it accom-
modates the interests of private stakeholders in ways that either ig-
nore important perspectives or conflict with regulatory goals.25
But negotiated regulation is hardly the only—and certainly not
the predominant—negotiation technique utilized by administrative
lawyers. It is far more common for regulations and final agency ac-
tions to be challenged on appeal before courts, where opportunities
for rulemaking settlement are far more frequent than—but certainly
may overlap with—traditional negotiated regulation.26 In fact, even in
Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest—EPA’s Woodstove
Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987) [hereinafter Funk, Woodstove Standards]; Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Comment, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation,
43 DUKE L.J. 1206 (1994); see also William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millenium:
Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1387 (1997)
[hereinafter Funk, Subversion] (concluding that “the incentives to make negotiated rulemaking
succeed themselves undermine and subvert the principles underlying traditional administrative
law by elevating the importance of consensus among the parties above the law, the facts, or the
public interest”).
23. See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 28–31
(1982) (offering a classic defense of negotiated regulation); see also Deborah S. Dalton, Negoti-
ated Rulemaking Changes EPA Culture, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
DESKBOOK 135, 146 (2001) (noting that prior to the EPA’s use of negotiated regulation, rule-
making in the agency was under fire).
24. See Funk, Woodstove Standards, supra note 22, at 80–81 (noting that groups with stakes
in woodstove regulation put pressure on the EPA); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 22, at 1216–17
(encouraging an examination of the procedures of private organizations influencing federal
policymaking). Coglianese also observes cases in which negotiated rules were subject to judicial
challenge, sometimes by those who participated in negotiations. Coglianese, supra note 18, at
1286–1309. A comprehensive critique of negotiated regulation is presented in Funk, Subversion,
supra note 22.
25. Funk, Woodstove Standards, supra note 22, at 80–81.
26. Coglianese calculates that negotiated regulation constitutes a mere one-tenth of one
percent of all rulemakings. Coglianese, supra note 18, at 1277. Some claim that the appeals rate
for rules is as high as 80 percent, but Coglianese presents convincing data that the appeals rate
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those cases in which negotiated regulation has been agreed to, parties
may later attempt to challenge an agency’s regulations in court.
Settlement of appeals is a common way for an agency to dispose
of an ongoing adversarial dispute.27 As a category, rulemaking settle-
ment includes pure bilateral settlements, in which private entities and
an agency agree on a course of action but courts play little or no en-
forcement role, as well as consent decrees, in which a court’s judicial
imprimatur has preemption and enforcement effects far beyond
purely consensual contractual settlement.28 Like negotiated regula-
tion, settlement of appellate litigation has much to commend it, in-
cluding the promotion of flexibility, efficiency in litigation and agency
enforcement, expediency on the part of both government and private
litigants, and legitimacy—to the extent settlement reflects the shared
consensus of stakeholders.
For example, in 1987, the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA) published its final rule regulating workplace
formaldehyde exposure.29 OSHA set its long-term formaldehyde ex-
posure limit at 1 part per million (ppm).30 Unions appealed, arguing
that long-term formaldehyde exposure levels should be set at 0.5 ppm
rather than 1 ppm.31 On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit re-
manded the rule because it concluded that OSHA needed to elabo-
for the most significant EPA rules is 35 percent or even lower. Id. at 1297–1301. Rules still are
far more likely to be appealed to the judicial system, and thus pose the opportunity for settle-
ment, than to undergo a regulatory negotiation process prior to adoption.
27. In his study of EPA rulemaking litigation, Coglianese observes that nearly half of the
cases filed between 1979 and 1990 resulted in voluntary dismissals prior to hearing. Cary Co-
glianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory Process, 30
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 735, 756 (1996). This is nearly twice the settlement rate for all appeals. Id.
As Coglianese notes, “[w]ith so much settlement activity, interest groups sometimes file an ac-
tion against the EPA just to maintain a seat at the bargaining table.” Id.
28. Gaba, supra note 7, at 1264. In practice, as an enforcement device, parties to a volun-
tary settlement frequently will request a court to approve the terms of the settlement as a con-
sent decree, providing a judicial imprimatur. Courts are inclined to comply if the settlement has
unanimous support, including that of the agency. Alternatively, to effectuate enforcement of a
voluntary settlement against the agency, private stakeholders in an appeal may request a stay of
the appeal pending agency implementation of the terms of the settlement. Arguably, courts
have broader review authority in approving consent decrees than in issuing stays. Id.
29. Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 1926.1148 (2001).
30. Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,168, 46,168 (Dec. 4, 1987).
OSHA’s short-term formaldehyde exposure limit was set at 2 ppm. Id. § 1910.1048(c)(2).
31. For discussion of the appellate litigation and ensuing settlement, see Charles C. Caldart
& Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of Developing and Implementing Environmental
and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 141, 171–73 (1999).
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rate more clearly its scientific reasoning.32 When OSHA stalled on
remand, industry and union groups independently began negotia-
tions. The private negotiations resulted in a compromise, setting the
exposure limit at 0.75 ppm, along with some modifications to other
requirements in the rule.33 The joint union-industry proposal was
submitted to OSHA, subjected to OSHA review, and reintroduced
into the notice and comment process. After a brief and uneventful no-
tice and comment process, the rule became final in June 1992.34 The
District of Columbia Circuit’s reversal of the original formaldehyde
rule had sent a signal that created strong incentives for the parties to
agree to a more stringent standard than that originally proposed by
OSHA. As one study describes it, “the very real threat that a more
stringent (0.5 ppm) standard would be set by traditional rulemaking
made possible the negotiation of a less stringent (0.75 ppm) stan-
dard.”35 To the extent that OSHA fully utilized a notice and comment
process to implement the terms of its settlement, the formaldehyde
settlement is relatively uncontroversial.36
In sum, both private stakeholders and agencies value settlement
to the extent it assists them in reducing or avoiding litigation costs.
Additionally, as OSHA’s formaldehyde settlement illustrates,
stakeholders see settlement as an important strategy for committing
an agency to a course of action, often involving a substantive policy
choice. Not surprisingly, the legality of rulemaking settlements is
sometimes called into question.37 Once an agency enters into an oth-
32. UAW v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
33. Caldart & Ashford, supra note 31, at 172–73.
34. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,290 (May 27, 1992)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1048) (providing that these standards would take effect on June 26,
1992).
35. Caldart & Ashford, supra note 31, at 173.
36. At the same time, however, Funk argues that the notice and comment process alone is
not a sufficient safeguard to protect the public interest in every case. Other administrative pro-
cedure requirements, such as the preparation of a statement of basis and purpose and the re-
quirement of arbitrary and capricious review, also are necessary to protect the public interest in
consensus solutions. Funk, Subversion, supra note 22, at 1371–72, 1374. As Funk observes, con-
sensus may come at the price of the public interest, the facts, or the law, even when an agency
utilizes notice and comment to implement the consensus. Id. at 1382–86. More than in the case
of rulemaking settlement, ex post review of final rules adopted through notice and comment
rulemaking following a consensus proposal helps to assure the protection of these values in the
adoption of negotiated regulations.
37. Shane, supra note 4, at 265. Judge Wilkey of the District of Columbia Circuit has
warned of the “evil(s) of government by consent decree,” including “its potential to freeze the
regulatory processes of representative democracy.” Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718
F.2d 1117, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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erwise valid settlement, modification of the terms of the settlement
through interpretation by that agency can give rise to considerable
confusion and undermine private stakeholder incentives for partici-
pating in settlements with the government.38 Similarly, if settlements
are not capable of enforcement, private stakeholders will face little
incentive to participate. On the other hand, always allowing settle-
ment to bind agencies can thwart flexibility and undermine the public
interest values promoted by administrative process.
B. Problems with Rulemaking Settlement: A Principal-Agent Gap
Although rulemaking settlements may overlap with collaborative
governance mechanisms such as negotiated regulation, they also dif-
fer in fundamental and important ways. In the course of briefly dis-
cussing the key differences between rulemaking settlement and nego-
tiated regulation, I sketch a simple principal-agent account of
administrative procedure to illustrate the particular deficiencies
unique to rulemaking settlement as compared to other collaborative
governance techniques, such as negotiated regulation. These differ-
ences illustrate how settlement may fall short of the goals of collabo-
rative governance techniques. The principal-agent model posits an
agent, here an administrative agency, as influenced by institutional
principals, here Congress, the president, and private stakeholders,
who are routinely key participants in the decisionmaking process un-
der the APA. As developed below, the incentives an agency faces to
settle an appeal may increase monitoring costs for these principals,
thus contributing to a principal-agent gap.39
38. For example, in another context, commentators raise concerns with government’s
changing the terms of the “regulatory compact” governing public utility industries, such as the
telecommunications, natural gas, and electric sectors, as firms in these industries are deregu-
lated. J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES
IN THE UNITED STATES 2–17 (1997) (arguing that deregulation can effectuate a taking or consti-
tute breach of contract). Critics, including me, observe that this argument has little basis in tak-
ings and government contracts jurisprudence, thwarts flexibility in regulatory decisionmaking,
and may lead to perverse results by encouraging private stakeholders to lobby government ex-
cessively for concessions that do not enhance the public welfare. E.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801, 821–28 (1999) (re-
viewing SIDAK & SPULBER, supra); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregu-
latory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1489–93 (2000); Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory
Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297, 298–99 (1998) (reviewing SIDAK & SPULBER, supra).
39. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976) (ob-
serving the problems involved in inducing an agent to maximize a principal’s welfare).
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The differences between rulemaking settlement and other col-
laborative governance techniques can be traced in large part to the
unique incentives that private litigants and agencies face when set-
tling appeals of agency rules. My analysis of the structural architec-
ture of rulemaking settlement draws on the common tripartite focus
on “exit,” “voice,” and “loyalty” as ways to influence institutional be-
havior.40 In the settlement context, the threat of exit—in the form of
expected private stakeholder litigation and the ensuing costs to the
agency—is the predominant incentive influencing agency litigants.
By threatening continued litigation against an agency, private
stakeholders in the appellate posture may be in a position to extract
concessions that an agency refused to make in the notice and com-
ment process. This is the primary incentive that private stakeholder
exit presents to agency litigants. The incentives that private exit poses
for agency negotiators to settle appeals, coupled with high expected
litigation costs to the agency as a consequence of such exit, contribute
to the principal-agent gap in the appellate context. That is, private in-
centives for exit coupled with high expected litigation costs for the
government may lead agency negotiators to make concessions in set-
tlement that are not necessarily in the public interest, widening the
disparity between the agency’s actions and those institutions and par-
ticipants to which the agency is accountable. After discussing the exit
problems, I discuss how attention to voice and loyalty might help to
minimize the principal-agent gap created by the threat of exit.
The principal-agent gap in the context of rulemaking settlement
is more problematic than in other contexts. First, settlement of an ap-
peal only becomes a possibility where traditional negotiated regula-
tion has fallen short in the goal of defusing adversarial challenges at
the front end of the agency regulatory process. Because the notice
and comment process runs its course prior to appeal of a final regula-
tion, rulemaking settlement does not provide the same benefit of dis-
couraging litigious behavior. Rulemaking settlement becomes a useful
40. This distinction is rooted in what is now considered a classic book in corporate and
managerial governance, Albert O. Hirschman’s, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Responses to Decline
in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970). Others draw on this vocabulary to understand the
class action litigation process. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Recon-
ciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 376–80
(2000) (observing that reform proposals for complex litigation can be channeled into exit, voice,
and loyalty strategies); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Ac-
tions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 341–42 (characterizing the Court’s recent decisions as using a
functional approach, rather than an approach embracing notions of exit, voice, or loyalty).
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strategy only once negotiated regulation has failed to prevent litiga-
tion. It should be noted, however, that rulemaking settlement in the
context of appellate litigation also may jump-start a new negotiated
regulation process before the agency. Although rulemaking settle-
ment can provide a range of benefits, including providing a forum for
negotiating outside the litigation process altogether,41 it does not pro-
vide the same forward-looking opportunity to avert adversarialism
that negotiated regulation does. To the extent an adversarial mindset
already has set in, and perhaps solidified, among parties to an appeal
by the time that settlement negotiations commence, the prospect for
strategic behavior on the part of participants is stronger in the context
of rulemaking settlement than in other collaborative governance con-
texts. Such strategic behavior has consequences for how the agency
and private parties participate in settlement negotiations.
A second difference is that rulemaking settlement frequently in-
volves a more limited number of parties than negotiated regulation.
In rulemaking settlement, the stakeholders participating in the set-
tlement are not necessarily inclusive of all those who might have been
interested in a regulation from initiation of the notice and comment
process, but instead is limited to parties present on appeal. Professor
Cary Coglianese has noted, for example, that “individual members of
the public file a considerable number of comments in the rulemaking
process but are left out of the nonpublic litigation process.”42 If the in-
centives for private exit are particularly strong, and expected litiga-
tion costs are high, agencies may find it advantageous to limit the par-
ties to an appeal and enter into negotiations.
To be sure, negotiated regulation, which also limits participation,
raises a similar concern,43 but particular caution may be warranted in
touting the benefits of rulemaking settlement given the strong incen-
tives for agency collusion in a limited settlement. Sometimes this deal
is not implemented through the notice and comment procedures that
41. Cognizant of this phenomenon, Coglianese observes that litigation itself plays an im-
portant institutional role in defining consensual relationships, and that the litigation process
provides a fundamentally different forum for framing consensus discussions. Coglianese, supra
note 27, at 761–63.
42. Id. at 758.
43. See Funk, Woodstove Standards, supra note 22, at 95 (arguing that an agency’s “respon-
sibility for determining the public interest . . . no longer provides the safeguard otherwise avail-
able for unrepresented interests”); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 22, at 1211 (observing that
“regulatory negotiation is not democratically legitimate unless all interested parties are ade-
quately represented”).
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were used in adopting the regulation that is the subject of litigation
and settlement.
For example, consider the rulemaking settlement that grew from
OSHA’s now-infamous lockout/tagout rulemaking. In 1989, OSHA
published a final regulation that required employers to place locks
and tags, such as circuit breakers, on machines and power supplies to
prevent industrial accidents.44 Six industry groups and two labor un-
ions filed for judicial review.45 The parties could not agree to a settle-
ment. However, one of the industry appellants, American Petroleum
Institute, entered into a compromise with OSHA.46 Pursuant to this
compromise, OSHA agreed to insert nonmandatory guidelines into
its enforcement manual.47 OSHA also made an official “correction” to
the rule, clarifying that “work permits or comparable means” could
substitute for group lockouts in certain situations.48 By adopting
guidelines outside of the notice and comment process—as permitted
under the interpretive rule or policy statement exceptions to notice
and comment rulemaking,49—OSHA was able to make concessions to
private stakeholders on appeal without undergoing the full notice and
comment process.
Although the lockout/tagout settlement seems like a pragmatic
effort on behalf of an agency to manage its scarce resources on ap-
peal, the difference from traditional negotiated regulation should
raise concerns. Union groups challenged the interpretation reached
during the settlement, but the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the
agency’s new interpretation because it was “consistent with the rec-
ord evidence and would have constituted a logical outgrowth of the
proposed rules if originally promulgated as corrected.”50 At a mini-
mum, the lockout/tagout settlement is suspect to the extent that it ex-
cluded the concerns of third parties that were central to the accept-
ability of the agency’s action under almost any account of agency
legitimacy. The fact that the settlement agreement did not include the
labor union heightens the potential for interest group capture of the
44. Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout), 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147 (2001).
45. Patrick Delbert Schmidt, Between Government and Client: The Roles of Lawyers in
Negotiating and Disputing Administrative Regulation 205 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Johns Hopkins University) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
46. Id. at 205–06.
47. Id. at 175–213.
48. 55 Fed. Reg. 38,677 (Sept. 20, 1990) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147).
49. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1994).
50. UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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agency decisionmaking process, rendering the agency’s interpretation
suspect. Although the agency’s policy choice may well have been un-
derstandable given the threat of further litigation, the procedural de-
ficiency in its implementation may raise an arbitrary and capricious-
ness concern.51
A third reason that rulemaking settlement raises heightened
principal-agent gap problems is the secretive nature of the process.
Settlement procedures, unlike negotiated regulations, are often
closed to the public. Settlement often results from confidential media-
tion in which the parties may not only be few, but also free from pub-
lic scrutiny.52 Professor Cary Coglianese observes that litigation and
the prospect of settlement “offer[] interest groups and the agency an
opportunity to do something they were not permitted to do in the no-
tice-and-comment period: negotiate in secret.”53 Rules governing ex
parte contacts, for example, do not apply once a final rule has been
issued.54 Confidential mediation is valued as a negotiation tool to the
extent that it encourages all parties to air their concerns openly and
honestly. At the same time, confidential settlement processes may
lead agencies to adopt positions that later raise opposition from af-
fected stakeholders. The results of a settlement may be rendered even
more suspect if an agency makes concessions outside of the notice
and comment process and fails to publish them in the Federal Regis-
ter.55 Where the incentives for private exit are strong and where ex-
51. The issue of making a policy choice to avoid litigation is further discussed infra at notes
83–85 and accompanying text.
52. The confidential nature of settlement also makes it a particularly difficult phenomenon
to study: settlements associated with judicial approval of a consent decree are often published,
but many settlements are made available only to those parties present in an appeal. Thus, be-
cause available data is not necessarily reflective of the practice, a study of settlements would not
easily lend itself to generalizations about the practice.
53. Coglianese, supra note 27, at 757.
54. Id.
55. Interpretive rules and policy statements are not required to undergo the notice and
comment process, but may be made effective upon publication. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1994)
(noting an exception to notice and comment for “interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice”). An agency is required, of
course, to publish such guidelines in the Federal Register to the extent that the guidelines ad-
versely affect individuals who may later decide to challenge the guidelines’ application to them.
Id. § 552(a)(1)(D). Although not all interpretive rules or policy statements are published, all
must be made available for public inspection and copying. Id. § 552(a)(2)(B). If an agency di-
rects its interpretive rules or policy statements to only particular parties or circumstances in the
course of a settlement, it may be able to take advantage of the exception to Federal Register
publication. See Nguyen v. United States, 824 F.2d 697, 700 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987) (observing that
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pected litigation costs are high, agencies may even be the party to
seek to ensure confidentiality in the settlement process.
The effects of confidentiality, coupled with the limited range of
stakeholder participants, pose a monitoring cost problem in the con-
text of rulemaking settlement. In an appellate posture, an agency and
its lawyers have incentives to settle to avoid litigation costs and more
quickly implement enforcement of a rule. Settlement may be prefer-
able in such a context, but it is not always socially desirable simply
because of litigation savings. Sometimes the stakeholders agreeing to
a settlement may not accurately reflect the full complexities of the
principal-agent relationship surrounding an agency’s decisionmaking
process. In particular, the interests of principals such as Congress or
stakeholders not actively participating in the judicial appeal may be
given short shrift. Compare this process with the ordinary negotiated
regulation process, where these principals are more likely to be in-
cluded in the agent’s negotiations because notice and comment rule-
making has yet to run its course. In other words, a principal-agent gap
may create a bias of sorts in the appeals settlement process that does
not necessarily apply in other collaborative governance contexts. For
example, ossification of the agency decisionmaking process may in-
crease the costs of litigating agency action, making negotiated regula-
tion or settlement more attractive to agencies and private parties.
Unlike negotiated regulation, however, settlement may be problem-
atic to the extent that it offers far less in the way of procedural protec-
tions and, potentially, less rigorous agency consideration of the action
ultimately taken.
A fourth and final contrast between rulemaking settlement and
negotiated regulation relates to the role of the courts. While negoti-
ated regulation occurs prior to appeal, and thus operates largely out-
side the pale of judicial scrutiny, the involvement of appellate courts
in rulemaking settlement has both adverse and beneficial implica-
tions. In the literature on civil settlements, commentators treat set-
tlements with skepticism on the grounds that they impede the genera-
tion of precedents on important matters of public policy,56 or that they
enable settling parties to act strategically to cause the creation of fa-
vorable precedents while avoiding the generation of unfavorable
§ 552(a)(2) “applies to those interpretations and policy statements directed to particular parties
or circumstances”).
56. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 10, at 1075 (arguing that settlements are often unjust and that
settlement should be “neither encouraged nor praised”).
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ones.57 To the extent that courts play a significant role in creating
precedents that protect the public interest, settlement of rule appeals
would seem to present the same concerns about stifling case law de-
velopment and manipulation of precedent that plague settlements
more broadly.
Of more potential benefit, however, is the role that courts have
an opportunity to play in evaluating rulemaking settlements by ap-
proving dismissal of a case, approving consent decrees, or staying an
adopted rule pending implementation of a settlement.58 Whether judi-
cial involvement in a rulemaking settlement promotes or impairs the
public interest will depend on the terms of the settlement, as well as
the standards the courts apply in approving it. On the one hand,
courts’ willingness to approve settlements based on the consensus of a
narrow range of stakeholders provides private stakeholders the op-
portunity to hold an agency hostage to a consensus that runs counter
to the public interest. On the other hand—notwithstanding the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit’s deferential approach in the OSHA lock-
out/tagout rulemaking settlement—judicial involvement holds prom-
ise to police the public interest aspects of rulemaking settlements. To
serve this function, courts must fashion an appropriate set of evalua-
tive standards for approving settlements. In addition, once settlement
is reached, courts continue to play a monitoring role: if an agency re-
neges on the terms of a settlement, other parties to the agreement
might seek judicial enforcement. In contrast to their role in rulemak-
ing settlement, courts serve little or no role in monitoring negotiated
regulation, and no role whatsoever in enforcing agency departures
from the terms of negotiated regulation.59
Equating rulemaking settlement with negotiated regulation—a
process itself fraught with problems60—masks unique problems posed
by the settlement of rule appeals. In its ideal form, negotiated regula-
tion may be a measuring stick against which rulemaking settlements
57. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 24–25
(2000) (arguing that settlement is often inefficient, especially in the context of repeat player liti-
gants, and that policies should promote the corrective capacity of the irrational litigant).
58. The APA allows a judge to stay agency action pending conclusion of an appellate pro-
ceeding. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1994). A pending appellate proceeding includes implementation of a
settlement agreement, so long as a court retains jurisdiction over the case pending implementa-
tion.
59. See, e.g., USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714–15 (7th Cir. 1996)
(allowing an agency to renege on a negotiated regulation).
60. See, e.g., Funk, Subversion, supra note 22, at 1374–76 (observing that negotiated regula-
tion is not necessarily consistent with the administrative process).
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can be evaluated, and perhaps even an ideal toward which settlement
should strive. It cannot be assumed, however, that rulemaking settle-
ments automatically adhere to the collaborative governance ideals
proponents of negotiated regulation embrace simply because they re-
flect private ordering. In particular, rulemaking settlement raises a
potential principal-agent gap for an agency’s policy choices that nego-
tiated regulation does not necessarily raise. The gap is due in part to
the more strategic mindset of private litigants, in part to strong incen-
tives for exit coupled with litigation cost consequences for the agency,
and in part to the increased role of the courts and the potential for the
manipulation of precedent. The involvement of courts in the settle-
ment process may hold promise as a way of mitigating this gap, in-
creasing the accountability of the settlement process and its regula-
tory results. After exploring some particular examples of settlements
run amok from the perspective of sound administrative procedure in
the next Part, I return to this theme in Part III, exploring how courts
can balance exit against voice and loyalty interests to hold agency liti-
gants accountable.
II.  RULEMAKING SETTLEMENT AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS
When rulemaking settlement works well, it conforms to the pro-
cedures afforded by negotiated regulation, effectuating a form of
collaborative governance between private interests and the agency.
This is most likely where a broad range of stakeholders participates in
the settlement and an agency affords new notice and comment proce-
dures to legitimate the results of a settlement. OSHA’s formaldehyde
rule is a good example.61Although OSHA’s compromise on appeal
departed from the specific terms of its proposed rule, OSHA’s posi-
tion in the settlement was within the scope of its initial position in the
proposed rulemaking—that the difference in the attendant risk asso-
ciated with a change from 0.5 ppm to 1 ppm was not “significant.”62
Thus, the agency’s agreement to adopt a 0.75 ppm standard easily
could be said to be a logical outgrowth of the initially proposed rule,
not subject to the provision of new notice and comment.63
61. See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text.
62. Caldart & Ashford, supra note 31, at 171–73.
63. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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Rulemaking settlement raises potential problems, however, to
the extent that crucial stakeholders are excluded from the negotia-
tion, as was the case with OSHA’s lockout/tagout settlement.64
Moreover, rulemaking settlement may jeopardize the public interest
if an agency departs substantially from the position it endorsed during
previous notice and comment procedures, or to the extent that the
settlement reflects an unscrutinized shift in the agency’s position. A
salient illustration of this problem with settlement arises during, but is
not limited to, presidential transitions—events that often reflect ma-
jor substantive policy shifts, even when the presidency stays in the
same political party. Rulemaking settlement presents two interesting
substantive problems that can arise during presidential transitions: an
outgoing administration may use settlement to commit a new admini-
stration to a policy course, or an incoming administration may use set-
tlement to undermine regulatory actions adopted by the outgoing
administration. Presidential transitions thus illustrate the larger
problem with using a settlement to effectuate an agency’s shift to a
new substantive policy position.
A. Settlement by Outgoing Administrations
To administrative law scholars, the controversies posed by set-
tlements during presidential transitions are not new. Much to the
chagrin of new presidents, outgoing administrations occasionally have
settled cases in ways that limit the discretion of the incoming admini-
stration. For example, in the closing months of the Carter administra-
tion, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) settled several
cases with environmental groups that had challenged the EPA for
failure to enforce the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (now
known as the Clean Water Act), charging the EPA with failure to
meet statutory deadlines and for consideration of improper criteria.65
Over the objections of three intervenors in the litigation, the EPA
agreed to a settlement amounting to “a detailed, comprehensive
regulatory program for implementation by EPA of the toxic pollutant
control and pretreatment objectives” of the Clean Water Act.66 The
EPA settlement did not dictate the substantive terms of the regula-
tion; it did, however, specify the general strategy the EPA would pur-
64. See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text.
65. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833, 1834 (D.D.C.
1979) [hereinafter Costle I].
66. Id. at 1834.
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sue in regulating toxins.67 In the consent decree, the EPA also tar-
geted particular industries and specific pollutants for investigation
and possible regulation, specifying deadlines by which regulations
would be issued and compliance demanded.68
After remanding the settlement for a determination that the
EPA had not improperly curtailed its regulatory discretion, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit upheld the settlement as it had been chal-
lenged and affirmed by a district court.69 On remand, the district court
held that the EPA had discretion to make such commitments with re-
spect to its regulatory programs,70 and the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit agreed on appeal again.71 Although the consent decree required
the agency to apply criteria and standards not found in the Clean Wa-
ter Act, and also required the agency to undertake programs not re-
quired by the statute, the District of Columbia Circuit panel upheld
the agreement and did not find this settlement to be an impermissible
interference with the agency’s discretion.72
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Wilkey warned of the “evil[s] of con-
sent decree[s],” including what he believed to be their “potential to
freeze the regulatory processes of representative democracy.”73 Judge
Wilkey reasoned that the court did not have the jurisdiction to im-
pose in a consent decree terms that it could not include in a judgment
67. As the District of Columbia Circuit described the consent decree, “[i]t did not specify
the substantive result of any regulations EPA was to propose and only required EPA to initiate
‘regulatory action’ for other pollutants identified through the research program.” Citizens for a
Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Gorsuch II]. Impor-
tantly, “the Companies would be free to influence the content of the proposed regulations by
participating in the rulemaking proceedings and then could attack the legality of any final regu-
lations in court.” Id.
68. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Costle
II].
69. Id. at 1259.
70. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 16 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2084, 2087
(D.D.C. 1982) [hereinafter Gorsuch I].
71. Gorusch II, 718 F.2d at 1128–30.
72. Id. at 1130.
73. Id. at 1136 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey observed:
[A] decree of this type binds not only those present Administrators who may wel-
come it, but also their successors who may vehemently oppose it. For reasons that ul-
timately have to do with preserving the democratic nature of our Republic, American
courts have never allowed an agency chief to bind his successor in the exercise of his
discretion.
Id. at 1137. Judge Wilkey did not, however, address how regulations are binding on subsequent
administrations.
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if the case were to go to trial.74 Academic commentary echoed these
concerns.75 Attorney General Meese gave his imprimatur to Judge
Wilkey’s view in his 1986 “Department Policy Regarding Consent
Decrees and Settlement Agreements,” which prohibits a government
agency from entering into a consent decree “that divests a [govern-
ment official] of discretion” or “that converts into a mandatory duty
the otherwise discretionary authority [of an official] to revise, amend,
or promulgate regulations.”76
Despite the policy announced by Attorney General Meese,
agencies have continued to enter into settlements that limit their dis-
cretion.77 For example, some pesticide manufacturers have urged
74. Id. at 1131 (“In short, the court can only enter as a consent decree such relief as would
have been within its jurisdictional power had the case gone to trial.”).
75. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insu-
late Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 315–17 (criticizing such consent
decrees for sidestepping the democratic process); Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting
Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with
the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203, 204 (1987) (observing the “obvious danger” that
consent decrees allow “one administration to commit its successors to policies they might not
otherwise have chosen”).
76. Memorandum from Edwin Meese III, Attorney General, to All Assistant Attorneys
General and All United States Attorneys 3, 4 (Mar. 13, 1986), reprinted in U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 150, 152–53
(Feb. 19, 1988). For an overview of this memorandum, see generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The
Attorney General’s Policy on Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements, 39 ADMIN. L. REV.
101 (1987) (suggesting that the new policy may increase litigation among agencies because of
the directive not to enter into constraining consent decrees or settlement agreements).
77. For criticisms of the Meese memorandum, see Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Con-
sent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy Making, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 327, 337–41 (arguing that guidelines were based on “an unreasonably restrictive view
of the permissible scope of settlement commitments”); Shane, supra note 4, at 266 (demon-
strating that legal backing for the attorney general’s argument was weak because of the distinc-
tion between enforcing consent decrees and settlement agreements). In the last term of Presi-
dent William Jefferson Clinton’s administration, an acting assistant attorney general in the
Office of Legal Counsel concluded that Attorney General Meese’s concerns were based in pub-
lic policy, not in legal limitations on the scope of the executive branch’s powers to settle litiga-
tion in manners that limit the future exercise of executive branch discretion. Memorandum from
Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Raymond
C. Fisher, Associate Attorney General, Authority of the United States to Enter Settlements
Limiting the Future Exercise of Executive Branch Discretion (June 15, 1999), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/olc/consent_decrees2.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Nevertheless,
remnants of the Meese memorandum survive in Subpart Y of Chapter 28 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, which addresses the authority of attorneys general to compromise and close civil
claims. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.160 (2001) (requiring assistant attorneys general to refer to the deputy
attorney general or the associate attorney general a “proposed settlement [that] converts into a
mandatory duty the otherwise discretionary authority of a department or agency to promulgate,
revise, or rescind regulations”).
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Christine Todd Whitman, President George W. Bush’s EPA adminis-
trator, to reject the terms of a January 19, 2001, EPA settlement with
the Natural Resources Defense Council.78 The settlement, agreed to
in the last days of the Clinton administration, stipulated that the EPA
must reevaluate the risks and set tolerances for eleven chemicals that
are considered particularly harmful to infants and children, as well as
decide the cumulative risks of four families of chemicals.79
Civil litigation jurisprudence would advise treating rulemaking
settlements as contracts, deferring to the voluntary nature of the set-
tlement agreement along with an agency’s judgment in entering into
the settlement. Although this approach raises little concern in the
context of voluntary, bilateral agreements, it also has been extended
to the enforcement of consent decrees. As the Supreme Court stated
in United States v. Armour & Co.:80
Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise;
in exchange for the savings of cost and elimination of risk, the par-
ties each give up something they might have won had they pro-
ceeded with the litigation. Thus the decree itself cannot be said to
have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed
to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those
opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining
power and skill to achieve. For these reasons, the scope of a consent
decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by refer-
ence to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.81
In contexts in which Congress has given private party standing to
challenge the agency’s actions, the cases acknowledge that agencies
need some discretion to manage their litigation resources through set-
tlement. So long as an agency commits itself to a course of action
within the scope of its delegated lawmaking powers, this is permissi-
ble, and courts often defer to the agency’s interpretation of the set-
tlement under Chevron.82
78. Cindy Skrzycki, Pesticide Firms Seek EPA Intervention, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2001, at
E1 (documenting the response of the pesticide industry to an EPA settlement reached at the
end of the Clinton administration).
79. These chemicals include organophosphates, commonly used insecticides. See id.
80.  402 U.S. 673 (1971).
81. Id. at 681.
82. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), courts will defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute to the extent that the statute
does not speak precisely to the question at issue. Id. at 843. In other words, to the extent that
Congress delegated interpretive discretion to the agency, courts will not second-guess the
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Deference to an agency’s interpretation of a settlement’s terms
subsequent to settlement approval has many advantages. One way to
conceptualize such choices in the context of settlement is to under-
stand them as any other agency policy choice. Instead of responding
to scientific or other underlying studies, as is normally the case in
rulemaking,83 the agency is responding to policy concerns that might
encompass the threat of further litigation and the ensuing costs. The
agency will be best positioned to make resource decisions regarding
strategy during litigation and, as the Court recognized in Armour, set-
tlement reflects a strategic choice in the adversarial litigation con-
text.84 Once parties have agreed to settlement, the Chevron deference
standard is desirable from the perspective of promoting effective
regulation, decreasing litigation costs, and enhancing the account-
ability of the agency decisionmaking process.85 For such reasons, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated: “We generally
defer to an agency’s interpretation of agreements within the scope of
the agency’s expertise . . . and the case for deference is particularly
strong when the agency has interpreted regulatory terms regarding
which it must often apply its expertise.”86
A court might extend such deference not only to an agency’s in-
terpretation of a previously approved settlement, but also to initial
agency’s interpretive choice. Where statutes are ambiguous, Chevron deference depends on an
assessment of whether an agency has been delegated authority to carry lawmaking force in its
interpretations. See infra notes 86, 108 and accompanying text. The Chevron doctrine promotes
both agency expertise and political accountability. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
83. See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text (discussing OSHA’s formaldehyde set-
tlement).
84. 402 U.S. at 681.
85. See Phillip G. Oldham, Regulatory Consent Decrees: An Argument for Deference to
Agency Interpretations, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 394 (1995) (arguing that the “fundamental shift
in the relationship between courts and agencies embodied in Chevron should encompass con-
sent decree interpretation”).
86. Wash. Urban League v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 886 F.2d 1381, 1386 (3d Cir.
1989). The Eighth Circuit requires substantial evidence to support an agency’s interpretation of
a settlement agreement. Miernicki v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 20 F.3d 354, 356 (8th Cir. 1994). Also,
courts appear to defer to agency interpretations of settlement agreements between private
stakeholders that the agency had the power to approve. See Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 169, 172–73 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (supporting judicial defer-
ence to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission where its reading of a contractual term
serves a limited regulatory purpose and does not “give rise to the specter of res judicata”); Nat’l
Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 811 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (concluding that a court must give deference to an agency’s resolution of a settlement
agreement where the issue involves merely the construction of language).
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approval of the settlement.87 To the extent that agencies retain flexi-
bility in the implementation of their settlement terms in subsequent
rulemaking proceedings, such settlements will be unlikely to raise sig-
nificant legitimacy concerns. However, agreeing to a specific regula-
tory standard in a settlement—such as a pollution or tolerance level—
raises some obvious procedural problems under the APA. In many
cases, including those discussed above, this is not a significant issue
since the details of the standards will be established through notice
and comment rulemaking following the settlement.
At the same time, to the extent that an agency is using settlement
to precommit itself to a substantive policy choice, the notice and
comment process may become little more than a charade. Where an
agency does not implement the terms of a settlement through notice
and comment but instead uses publication rules to implement the
terms of a settlement in ways that are not binding, courts will not ex-
tend Chevron deference to the settlement.88 Moreover, if deference is
too strong, the settlement agreement becomes meaningless, and pri-
vate parties will have little incentive to settle with administrative
agencies.89
Settlement by outgoing administrations illustrates the problem
with deferring to settlement merely because it reflects a voluntary
agreement among litigants, including the agency. Without standards
for careful evaluation of rulemaking settlements, courts may uninten-
tionally bind a new administration or may open the litigation process
to strategic manipulation in the months preceding a presidential tran-
sition. Chevron, commonly understood to mean deference to the
87. Consider, for example, Southern Union Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion, 840 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1988):
The Commission’s interest in ordering its docket is especially strong here, where peti-
tioners are seeking to reopen a settlement agreement to which they were themselves
signatories. . . . We have had occasion more than once to observe the breadth of the
Commission’s discretion with respect to settlements, as well as the broad public inter-
est favoring the settlement of complex rate matters.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2167 (2001) (ob-
serving that “the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed
the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication,” not interpretive rules and
policy statements); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (finding that inter-
pretations contained in an opinion letter do not warrant Chevron-type deference).
89. For this reason, even strong advocates of Chevron deference couple it with rigorous
arbitrary and capricious review of the agency’s interpretation of ambiguous terms. See Oldham,
supra note 85, at 414 (noting that the review for arbitrariness “should closely mirror arbitrary-
and-capricious review under Chevron, largely based on the standard articulated in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act”).
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agency’s law and policy choices, does not always mandate strong judi-
cial deference to settlement in this context.
B. Settlement by Incoming Administrations
Settlement also can be problematic from a legitimacy perspective
when used by an incoming administration to modify or repeal
adopted regulations. To the extent that a new administration uses the
settlement of lawsuits as a housecleaning tool, it may be an important
mechanism for implementing new policy positions.
For instance, the transition between President Bill Clinton and
President George W. Bush gave rise to charges of “midnight regula-
tion.”90 Settlement of challenges to midnight regulations may have
been one way for the incoming administration to provide relief from
hastily adopted and ill-conceived regulatory programs. At the same
time, charges of an unprecedented proliferation of midnight regula-
tions during the waning months of the Clinton administration were
greatly exaggerated, leveled largely as a media strategy to discredit
the policy approach of the outgoing administration. Midnight regula-
tions often reflect the culmination of a lengthy rulemaking process, a
process that is sometimes held up against the agency’s wishes for po-
litical or budgetary reasons.91 To the extent that recently adopted
rules face pending challenges in court, an incoming president’s agency
might enter into a settlement, enshrining it in a consent decree that
promises to notice a repeal or modification to the rules. Such consent
decrees also may promise to suspend enforcement of new rules
90. See John B. Judis, Round Midnight, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 11 (noting the
last-minute regulations and executive orders in such fields as the environment, workers’ health
and safety laws, and trade); Cindy Skrzyzcki, “Midnight Regulations” Swell Register, WASH.
POST, Jan. 23, 2001, at E1 (outlining the response of the Bush administration to late regulations,
including the instruction to agencies to write to the Federal Register to terminate publication).
91. According to one account:
[V]irtually all the regulations finished by federal agencies shortly before Clinton left
office had been developed over years, according to government documents, outside
policy analysts, and officials of the Bush and Clinton administrations. Some had been
delayed by lawsuits or because Republican-led Congresses of the mid- to late-1990s
had explicitly forbidden federal agencies to work on them.
Moreover, the regulations completed during Clinton’s final weeks in office were in
step with a brisk pace of regulatory work throughout his two terms—and with a long-
standing practice in which presidents of both political parties have issued many regu-
lations just before they departed.
Amy Goldstein, “Last-Minute” Spin on Regulatory Rite, Bush Review of Clinton Initiatives Is
Bid to Reshape Rules, WASH. POST, June 9, 2001, at A1.
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pending the outcome of a new rulemaking proceeding, but if such
suspension is indefinite a decree is probably subject to attack.
Consider the following example: before Congress’s landmark
vote to suspend OSHA’s ergonomics rules,92 business lobbies, led by
the United States Chamber of Commerce, already had filed suit
against the rules on the somewhat spurious grounds that the govern-
ment did not conduct sufficient consultation (despite eight years of
public hearings) before issuing the rules.93 If President George W.
Bush’s administration had attempted to change these “midnight”
rules through settlement with the challengers, it is likely that it would
have had far more difficulty explaining the legitimacy of its action
than arose in the context of congressional disapproval.
To be sure, an agency’s discretion to settle is sometimes con-
strained by law. Courts have held, for instance, that an agency cannot
indefinitely suspend rules by agreeing not to enforce them.94 In re-
sponse to a rule challenge, an agency may enter into a consent decree
to propose a new rule. It probably also can suspend applicability of a
rule pending the outcome of the new rulemaking process. An alto-
gether more difficult question, however, is whether an agency, as a
part of a settlement, can commit itself to adopting or repealing a par-
ticular rule. If the appeal is understood as a part of the rulemaking
process, an agency probably cannot make such a commitment, to the
extent that it renders the notice and comment a charade. An agency
can agree, however, to the substance of a proposed rule—at least to
the extent the substance of the rule is a matter of agency discretion—
although the agency’s commitment probably is not enforceable by a
court.95
So, looking to OSHA’s ergonomics rules, had Congress not pro-
vided relief to the rules’ challengers, the Department of Labor might
92. This vote was the first time that Congress used its fast-track, joint approval process,
established in 1996, to suspend a rule. Steven Greenhouse, House Joins Senate in Repealing
Rules on Workplace Injuries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2001, at A19; Steven Greenhouse, Senate
Votes to Repeal Rules Clinton Set on Work Injuries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001, at A1.
93. See Alice Lipowicz, Injury Rule Puts Strain on Businesses; New Standards Too Costly,
Employers Say; Delay is Sought, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Feb. 12, 2001, at 22 (discussing the efforts
of the National Coalition for Ergonomics, a coalition of business groups, to overturn the rule).
94. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 766 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that
indefinite suspension of rules issued under the Clean Water Act constitutes repeal of the rule).
95. Enforceability of such a settlement term probably raises some separation of powers
concerns. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 75, at 297–99 (discussing the constitutional limits on
consent decrees); Rabkin & Devins, supra note 75, at 226–28 (outlining a general theory of con-
stitutional limitations).
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have used settlement of the lawsuit as a means to re-notice the rules.
Absent the lawsuit, however, the Department of Labor could have re-
noticed the rules, proposing repeal, anyway. The lawsuit challenging
the ergonomics rules would have provided the department a rationale
for suspending enforcement of the rules pending the outcome of a
new rulemaking to repeal or modify the rules. That new rulemaking,
though, would have been subject to APA standards of review once
final rules were adopted, and labor interests almost certainly would
have sought to raise arbitrariness arguments on appeal if the result of
the new rulemaking was repeal of the ergonomics rules.
Such settlement is not limited to hypotheticals. It has been used
regularly by incoming administrations. One particularly high-profile
settlement involved the Department of Interior’s recent decision to
prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement studying the
impact of snowmobile and other winter-vehicle use in Yellowstone
Park, made in the face of a pending appeal. This decision, approved
by a federal judge in Wyoming, was seen as a first step in George W.
Bush’s reversal of the Clinton administration’s ban on snowmobile
use in Yellowstone Park.96 Environmental groups, concerned that
objections to the data behind the snowmobile ban were driven not by
process but by dissatisfaction with the outcome, raised considerable
objection to the decision.97
In another example, commencing shortly after President George
W. Bush’s inauguration, the United States Department of Agriculture
entered into a settlement with hog producers who had challenged an
adopted (but not yet published) agency rule.98 The agency’s settle-
ment reversed a Clinton administration rule that would end the pork
promotion program, a program known for advertising “the other
white meat” with funds collected from a tax on independent hog
farmers. The rule had been adopted following a referendum by the
farmers to end the program.99 The referendum results announced
96. Katharine Q. Seeyle, U.S. to Reassess Snowmobile Ban in a Park, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
2001, at A10.
97. The Fund for Animals Condemns Snowmobile Litigation Settlement Agreement, PR
NEWSWIRE, July 5, 2001; Anuj Gupta, Yellowstone Snowmobile Ban May Lift, L.A. TIMES, June
30, 2001, at A11; Mr. Bush’s Miscalculation, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2001, at A12.
98. The significance of the distinction between adoption and publication was that the rule
had been formally endorsed by the agency but was not yet “final” for purposes of APA review.
99. Publication of the rule had been held up in part due to a temporary restraining order
and in part due to Andrew Card’s memorandum. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr.,
to the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Regulatory Review
Plan (Jan. 20, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (directing agencies to withhold sending
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January 11, 2001, showed that a majority of producers and importers
who voted favored termination (15,951-14,396).100 Shortly after the
agency’s announcement, on January 12, 2001, the National Pork Pro-
ducers Council, along with the Michigan Pork Producers Association,
filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction against the agency in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan.101 The
challenge alleged that the agency did not have the authority to call for
a referendum and that the voting process was riddled with irregulari-
ties.102 Pursuant to a temporary restraining order, the agency was pro-
hibited from publishing a final rule to terminate the Pork Promotion,
Research, and Consumer Information Order.103 A subsequent order
by the judge, drawing on a memorandum from Andrew Card, Presi-
dent Bush’s chief of staff, allowed for publication of a final rule
pending review by Bush administration officials but required that the
effective date of the rule be delayed for at least sixty days.104 The
agency followed by entering into a settlement with the challengers.105
regulations to the Office of the Federal Register pending review by the Office of President
Bush, postponing for sixty days the effective date of regulations published in the Federal Regis-
ter but not yet effective, and withdrawing all regulations sent to the Office of the Federal Regis-
ter but not yet published).
100. William Claiborne, Hog Farmers Vow to Sue USDA; Agency’s Reversal on Vote
Against Promotion Fee Stirs Anger, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2001, at A7.
101. Id. Since the rule had not been published, it was not final and this lawsuit was not an
appeal of the agency’s final action under the APA.
102. These arguments, in general terms are: (1) the Secretary of Agriculture did not have
the legal authority to call for a referendum on the pork promotion program given that fifteen
percent of the eligible pork producers and importers did not sign a petition to request a referen-
dum; (2) the Secretary of Agriculture did not have the legal authority to terminate the pork
promotion program at all, and; (3) given the numerous irregularities identified in the implemen-
tation and voting on the referendum, there was no clear determination on the true outcome of
the vote. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4, Michigan Pork Producers Ass’n, Inc. v. Glickman, No. 01CV-34, U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1359 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 2001).
103. See U.S. Reverses Plan to End Pork Promotion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at A19 (dis-
cussing the settlement by the Department of Agriculture to continue promoting pork).
104. For more on the case, see Agric. Mktg. Serv., Pork Checkoff Program, USDA, at http://
www.ams.usda.gov/lsg/mpb/pork.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). According to a New York Times account, this settlement has transformed small hog
farmers into “angry activists.” Elizabeth Becker, Unpopular Fee Makes Activists of Hog Farm-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2001, at A1. A small group of hog farmers from four Midwestern states,
Campaign for Family Farms, has requested a federal court to uphold the initial vote, because it
had been certified by the General Accounting Office and the inspector general of the Agricul-
ture Department, as well as the previous agency head. Id.
105. The settlement is available online at Agric. Mktg. Serv., Settlement Agreement, USDA,
at http://www.ams.usda.gov/hotissues/fnlsettl.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2001) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
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The pork producers’ settlement reflects a major shift in the
agency’s substantive policy position on the legitimacy of the referen-
dum underlying the adopted rule. In agreeing to the settlement, the
agency reversed its prior position, developed through notice and
comment. There was no notice and comment for withdrawal of the
rule ending the pork promotion program. At a minimum, if the
agency relied on information of voting irregularities in the referen-
dum, cases like Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus106 would seem
to require the agency to subject its new methods for determining the
legitimacy of a referendum to notice and comment.107
But, the agency may argue—as incoming administrations often
do in the case of an outgoing administration’s settlements—that this is
an agency’s new legal interpretation, subject to Chevron deference. If
the basis for the settlement is a legal issue subject to Chevron defer-
ence, however, there is a strong argument that it should have been
developed through notice and comment rulemaking—especially since
it reverses an agency interpretation that previously was adopted
through notice and comment rulemaking. To be sure, one may argue
that legal interpretations adopted in briefs on appeal in defense of
agency interpretations may be subject to Chevron deference,108 but a
shift in agency legal interpretation adopted in the course of litigation
or through non–notice and comment procedures should not be used
as a basis for sub rosa repeal or modification of a rule that has been
adopted through notice and comment. Such shifting legal interpreta-
tions risk turning the notice and comment process into little more
than a sham.
106. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
107. Id. at 392–94 (“[I]nformation should generally be disclosed as to the basis of a proposed
rule at the time of issuance.”).
108. In Christensen v. Harris County, 592 U.S. 576 (2000), Justice Scalia’s concurrence rec-
ognized that a legal interpretation adopted in a solicitor general’s brief, co-signed by an agency
head, is entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring). After United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001), however, a majority of the Court’s members
recognize an agency’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference only where an agency has
been delegated authority to speak with the force of law and where the agency makes its inter-
pretation with a lawmaking pretense in mind. Id. at 2172–74. Agency legal interpretations
adopted in the course of notice and comment rulemaking or formal adjudication are subject to
the safe harbor of Chevron, but interpretations adopted in other contexts will be evaluated on a
case by case basis. Id. Significantly, Mead suggests that a factor in assessing whether the agency
had a lawmaking purpose is the agency’s intent to bind third parties to the interpretation. Id. at
2174. A litigation position in a brief presumably binds no one.
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III.  CLOSING THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAP IN
RULEMAKING SETTLEMENT
Agency concession on substantive policy issues in the course of
an appellate settlement raises serious legitimacy concerns, especially
when it occurs in the context of presidential transitions. In the context
of rulemaking settlements, there is a potential that negotiations will
be limited to a small number of parties who are not carefully selected
for inclusion. Since settlement can occur outside the realm of proce-
dural protections afforded by the APA, an agency can readily make
concessions that run contrary to the views of excluded stakeholders.
To the extent that an agency uses settlement to commit itself to a sub-
stantive policy position, there is no guarantee that this position will be
consistent with an agency position developed earlier under APA pro-
cedures. If courts merely rubber-stamp settlements, they will contrib-
ute to the principal-agent gap in monitoring the accountability of
agency rulemaking.
Yet, under existing doctrine, the exact role that courts should
play in evaluating settlements and their implementation is unclear,
leaving much to judicial discretion. In terms of mood, courts can take
a deferential approach and treat settlements as any other contract, or
may decide to invoke more rigorous arbitrary and capricious review
in evaluating the merits of settlements. A deferential approach places
a strong emphasis on exit interests as a monitoring device. My argu-
ment is that, although protecting participatory rights of exit (in the
form of a party’s right to object to a settlement) is necessary, a focus
on voice and loyalty concerns over exit interests also will serve an im-
portant function in enhancing the accountability of rulemaking set-
tlement. Courts should not rely on exit incentives alone to protect the
public interest during rulemaking settlement. They also must play a
role in striking a balance between voice and loyalty as distinct ways of
holding the agency’s policy choices to account.109
In terms of timing, courts may evaluate settlements ex ante—at
the time of the initial settlement—or ex post—in reviewing final
agency action implementing a settlement. As I argue in this Part, the
109. This paradigm for evaluating the various ways of influencing institutional behavior in
the context of civil settlements is presented in Coffee, supra note 40, at 376, which draws on the
classic work by Albert Hirschman, supra note 40. In other litigation contexts not involving the
creation of law and policy by administrative agencies, the role of exit may be more significant.
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 40, at 376 (arguing for attention to “exit” and “voice” over “loyalty”
in civil class action litigation).
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potential for accountability problems can be minimized if courts care-
fully evaluate participation in settlement agreements where settle-
ment involves an agency’s commitment to pursuing a substantive
policy position, respecting voice as well as exit in this context. Al-
though necessary, monitoring settlement participation is hardly suffi-
cient. To enhance accountability, courts also should pay attention to
loyalty influences by applying APA review standards, including arbi-
trary and capricious review, to review the merits of settlements ex
ante, at the approval stage.
A. Monitoring Settlement Participation
In ex post review of repeals or modifications to regulations im-
plementing settlements, broad opportunities for intervention are
commonplace, allowing for collateral attack of the final rule even by
groups who were not necessarily parties to an initial settlement. In
evaluating the various types of participation in rulemaking settle-
ment, it is important to distinguish exit interests from voice interests.
Exit interests represent the rights of parties to a proceeding, or those
who are aware of a pending proceeding and able to intervene, not to
agree to the settlement. By failing to agree to a settlement, a party ef-
fectively exits the consensual governance mechanism by continuing
with litigation.
Of course, protecting exit interests is the most fundamental type
of participation necessary to ensure the legitimacy of a settlement.
Civil class action settlements provide a particularly useful analogy in
understanding the value of exit interests in assisting courts in moni-
toring settlements. In the context of class action settlements, a class
member who has been inadequately represented may attack the class
judgment in subsequent litigation.110 Martin v. Wilks111 clarified the
question, holding that res judicata does not require absent class
members to object to inadequate representation in class proceed-
ings.112 In that well-chronicled case, a group of white firefighters had
sued Birmingham, Alabama, alleging that an affirmative action con-
110. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (holding that those privy to the set-
tlement agreement but not made parties to the litigation could not be bound by a decree on a
theory that the suit was a class suit in which they were adequately represented); see also Patrick
Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79
TEX. L. REV. 383, 432–46 (2000) (discussing the continued applicability of Hansberry notwith-
standing recent appellate cases rejecting the rule).
111. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
112. Id. at 763–65.
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sent decree violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.113 The
white firefighters had not intervened in the suit that had been re-
solved by a consent decree, so the defendants in Martin argued that
they were bound by the terms of the consent decree.114 The Court
held, however, that even white firefighters who were on notice of the
opportunity to intervene in the earlier proceeding were not bound
because they were not parties.115 According to the Court, the rules of
civil procedure make “[j]oinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a
lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene . . . the method by which po-
tential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound
by a judgment or decree.”116 Similarly, the failure of a stakeholder to
object to a settlement on appeal should not preclude its later ability to
attack the settlement collaterally, as may occur ex post in appeal of a
final rule implementing a settlement.117
Martin v. Wilks involved a type of exit interest—an effort by po-
tential intervenors to object to unacceptable terms of a settlement
and to litigate outside of the context of the consensus reflected in the
settlement. Just as in the context of civil class actions, those parties to
an appeal who are on notice of a settlement must retain the ability to
attack the settlement collaterally. Protecting participatory rights of
exit—in the form of a party’s right to object to the terms of settle-
ment—is a necessary form of participation in promoting the account-
ability of rulemaking settlement. If a key stakeholder objects to the
settlement’s terms, that stakeholder can continue to litigate the
agency’s initial action as a party or can attack the settlement in a
separate proceeding.
In the administrative law context, however, if a settlement has
consequences beyond the immediate parties, such as influence on an
113. Id. at 759–60.
114. Id. at 760.
115. Id. at 761.
116. Id. at 765.
117. Although collateral attack may be permissible in federal courts, state courts may not
allow it to the same degree. In state courts, the Full Faith and Credit Clause may preclude later
collateral attack to a settlement or consent decree. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S.
461, 481–82 (1982) (stating that “state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum
procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in order to qual-
ify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law”); State v. Canney, 562 A.2d 1315, 1316
(N.H. 1989) (noting that a collateral attack on administrative determinations is precluded where
the allegedly aggrieved party failed to exercise his statutory right to appeal); United Am. Ins.
Co. v. Whaland, 337 A.2d 358, 360 (N.H. 1975) (rejecting an insurer’s belated challenge to an
administrative order because its finality did not offend due process).
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agency interpretation or policy regarding the public interest, a focus
on exit interests alone may not be sufficient to ensure institutional ac-
countability. For example, as illustrated here, key stakeholders may
lack party status, or may not know the terms of a settlement. Exit in-
terests serve an important role in settlement of administrative rule
appeals by creating a strong incentive for an agency to make conces-
sions to certain litigants in the appellate context. At the same time,
the prospect of exit from a settlement may encourage an agency to
keep its settlement confidential, negotiate with only a small number
of parties, or limit the scope of parties present in an appeal. In this
sense, exit interests may widen the principal-agent gap in the settle-
ment of appeals involving administrative agencies. In the context of
appeals, exit interests can have a perverse effect on agency litigant
behavior, creating a tension with the interests of other stakeholders
who might hold the agency accountable for its negotiation.
Thus, beyond protecting exit interests, some attention also must
be given to the voice interests of affected stakeholders. Voice inter-
ests differ from exit interests in that they are not limited to those who
already are actual parties to an appeal, but encompass the possible
universe of stakeholders who may participate in settlement proceed-
ings. Attention to these interests broadens the universe beyond actual
parties and those who are on actual notice of the settlement to in-
clude potential stakeholders who may not even know that a settle-
ment has been agreed to or that an appellate proceeding is pending.
As discussed above, limited participation in appellate litigation
allows an agency to commit itself to a course of action in settlement
that is not necessarily consistent with the public interest. Especially
since a settlement and its approval are not governed by the APA’s
procedural requirements, including APA ex parte contact require-
ments, expansive participation in settlement negotiations and broad
intervention for purposes of judicial challenge of settlements can
serve an important function in preserving the public interest. For ju-
dicial review to be effective, ex ante opportunities for participation in
the initial settlement negotiations, as well as for judicial challenge to a
settlement, also must be expansive. Unless an agency’s regulatory
process specifically provides for published notice of settlement pro-
ceedings involving rule appeals, participation in settlement negotia-
tions typically will be limited to those parties present on appeal.
In the context of ordinary civil litigation, courts often accept the
agreement of those present, because potential parties have incentives
to participate when there is truly something at stake, typically money.
ROSSI.DOC 02/05/02  10:36 AM
1048 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1015
In the context of rulemaking settlement, though, a heterogeneous
range of interests—such as workplace safety, the environment, diver-
sity, the quality of life, or other non-monetary preferences—coupled
with less salient incentives for widespread private participation in ap-
peals may make reliance on voluntary participation less reliable. In
appeals of agency regulations, the interests of possible stakeholders
are not nearly as homogenous as those quibbling over the amount of
a monetary judgment in the typical civil tort suit. Certainly, some
stakeholders may be concerned with the costs of compliance or the
monetary benefits associated with a regulatory program. But the
range of interests in the typical regulatory proceeding is far broader
and more diverse. Interest groups may raise concerns with workplace
safety, the environment, diversity, the quality of life, or other non-
monetary preferences—interests that also do not always create par-
ticularly salient incentives for participation in an appeal. Another fac-
tor thwarting participation in settlements is an informational imbal-
ance. In many instances, interest groups may not even be aware of a
serious judicial challenge or where that challenge has been mounted,
let alone that settlement negotiations have commenced on topics po-
tentially affecting the substance of a regulation.
In contrast to the range of interests at issue in a rulemaking set-
tlement, consider the identity of the potential participants. Although
the potential variety of interests at stake in a rulemaking settlement
may be problematic, the identity of potential participants is more
easily ascertainable than in, for instance, mass civil tort litigation.
Since the notice and comment rulemaking process already has run its
course by the time a regulation reaches the appellate posture, notice
of the settlement and an opportunity to comment or participate could
readily and fairly be limited to participants in the previous rulemak-
ing proceeding.118 In monitoring settlement negotiations, courts may
118. Similarly, in granting intervention to challenge settlements, courts do not necessarily
need to decide whether a party has standing to appeal ex post a regulation implementing a set-
tlement. Intervention can be limited for purposes of participating in a settlement or challenging
the settlement agreement. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 5 F.3d 707, 710 (3d Cir.
1993) (upholding a lower court order allowing intervenors “active participation in the status of
objectors to the settlement agreement”); Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 960–61 (11th Cir.
1986) (holding that white federal employees may participate in developing a remedy to dis-
crimination against black employees); Kirkland v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 711 F.2d 1117,
1128 (2d Cir. 1983) (allowing white corrections officers to intervene in a suit between black offi-
cers and the corrections department for the limited purposes of participating in hearings on
proposed settlement); Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1141, 1142 (6th Cir. 1980) (permitting inter-
vention for the limited purpose of providing evidence about past discrimination against His-
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need to referee whether parties have been afforded adequate notice
of a settlement. However, active judicial supervision is not required to
ensure the airing of a settlement among the rulemaking’s participants.
Since regulations already have been generated through the notice and
comment process, a court readily can consider the viewpoints of those
who commented previously on the proposed rule and are likely to be
interested in the settlement. To ensure that key participants in the no-
tice and comment process are not ignored in settlement, a court might
even require the agency itself to provide this type of opportunity for
participation as a condition of approval of any settlement in appeals
of substantive notice and comment rules.
Once a negotiation has run its course and settlement is reached,
an opportunity for ex ante judicial challenges can assist in narrowing
the principal-agent gap and increase accountability. Broad opportuni-
ties for such challenges seem uncontroversial to the extent that an
agency uses the settlement process to effectively eviscerate or modify
terms previously adopted through notice and comment rulemaking,
especially to the extent that the implementation of the settlement will
not necessarily result in final agency action subject to APA review. If
settlement terms trigger interpretive rules and policy statements that
modify the nature of a previously adopted regulation, broad ex ante
participation that raises concerns with the settlement will help to en-
sure that the settlement is subject to the same opportunities for re-
view afforded APA-promulgated interpretive rules or policy state-
ments. It also will assist courts in evaluating the extent to which
regulated stakeholders are able to collude with one or two other
stakeholders in securing a settlement that would be unacceptable to
other key stakeholders, if they too were present as primary parties to
the appeal.119
panics); Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 606 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1979) (allowing a group of
investors to intervene by participating in hearings between party-investors and a corporation
over settlement terms).
119. As John Coffee has described class action settlements, “At its worse, this process can
develop into a reverse auction, with the low bidder among the plaintiffs’ attorneys winning the
right to settle with the defendant.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass
Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1354 (1995) (arguing that class action settlements
present an opportunity for defense lawyers to collude with weak plaintiff’s lawyers, who may
not adequately represent the interests of their clients in settlement).
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B. Ex Ante Hard Look Review of the Merits of Settlements
A settlement of an appeal challenging a regulation risks widening
the principal-agent gap in regulatory decisions. Since public participa-
tion in the rulemaking settlement process may be narrower and more
secretive than that occurring through normal APA procedures, an
agency can make concessions that are not acceptable to key princi-
pals, whether they be discrete and identifiable interest groups or the
more amorphous “public interest.” Indeed, an agency faced with the
prospect of delayed rule enforcement, litigation costs, and protracted
appeals may have strong incentives to settle with the parties on ap-
peal even if the settlement is contrary to rules adopted through far
broader and public notice and comment rulemaking. Because of those
same incentives, agencies cannot be depended upon to advocate for
those principals and interests that are not part of the settlement bar-
gain when they are arguing in favor of judicial acceptance of a con-
sent decree. Even where all key stakeholders are present, judicial
deference to the bargain struck during a settlement invites an agency
to ignore the law, the facts, and the public interest.120
Because the prospect of exit poses the threat of continued litiga-
tion, some monitoring of voice interests, both in participation in set-
tlement negotiations and during judicial evaluation, is necessary to
protect the public interest. Respecting voice through participation
alone, however, is not sufficient to protect the public interest in the
negotiation and approval of settlements. To expose the potential
“blind spot” of rulemaking settlement, APA standards of review also
must apply to judicial endorsement of a settlement. For judicial re-
view to be effective, a court should not limit the applicability of APA
standards to ex post evaluation, as the reviewing court scrutinizes fi-
nal agency action implementing a settlement. Judicial review of the
merits also must reach back ex ante, to settlement negotiation and
settlement approval. In addition to exit and voice interests, loyalty in-
terests—the agency’s fidelity to its statutory mandate and other key
principals not present on appeal—also must play a role in holding set-
tlements to account. To the extent courts can use ex ante review to
monitor the fidelity of agency concessions during settlement to key
principals who are not necessarily present on appeal, judicial moni-
toring of settlements also can further loyalty interests.
120. For a similar critique of negotiated regulation, see Funk, Subversion, supra note 22, at
1387.
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To be sure, administrative agencies usually are considered effec-
tive institutions for protecting the public interest in the implementa-
tion of regulatory decisions. To a large extent, gaps in the principal-
agent relationship between interest groups and the public interest, on
the one hand, and an administrative agency, on the other, are nar-
rowed through ex post judicial review of administrative regulations.
When an agency’s regulations are reviewed after adoption, ex post
judicial review, coupled with political oversight such as congressional
or executive review, helps to protect loyalty interests.
Such review, expressly provided for in the APA,121 helps to en-
sure that the public interest is not skirted through a rulemaking set-
tlement and its implementation. Ex post review—including a look
back at the settlement after full implementation in regulation or some
other agency action—can be an effective vehicle for narrowing the
principal-agent gap. On appeal, adopted regulations, as well as inter-
pretive rules and policy statements, will be subject to review for their
arbitrariness and capriciousness.
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,122 the Supreme Court articulated the test
for ex post review of adopted regulations, especially where there is a
change from a previously adopted agency position. The case arose
when the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
decided to rescind a previously adopted regulation that would have
mandated the inclusion of passive restraints on new cars, on the
ground that the safety benefits of the rule did not justify its compli-
ance costs for automobile manufacturers.123 NHTSA’s decision, a
small part of President Ronald Reagan’s implementation of a broader
regulatory relief agenda, followed years of dispute regarding the
standard for automobile air bags.124
As the Court stated in State Farm, an agency rule is arbitrary and
capricious if in adopting it
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
121. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
122. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
123. Id. at 38–39.
124. Id. at 34–39.
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be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency exper-
tise.125
Under this standard, the Court rejected NHTSA’s rule rescinding the
passive restraint standard as arbitrary and capricious. The Court held
that the agency had failed to explain its basis for completely aban-
doning the passive restraint rule where record evidence only faulted
automatic seatbelts, not all passive restraints.126 The Court not only
faulted the agency for failing to consider the alternatives, it also re-
quired the agency to explain the factual premises for its actions. In
particular, the Court observed, the agency had failed to explain how
the rulemaking record supported the agency’s premise that drivers
and passengers would, in fact, disable detachable automatic seat-
belts.127 In elaboration, the Court held that an agency must consider
the factors that Congress intended it to consider in making its deci-
sions. In State Farm, the Court reasoned, “Congress intended safety
to be the pre-eminent factor” in NHTSA’s adoption of standards for
automobile design.128
The judicial demand for reasoned decisionmaking articulated in
State Farm works to narrow the principal-agent gap in an agency’s
policy choices. For example, one can understand the safety emphasis
in the statute as a way for the political coalition that prevailed in
Congress at the time of the statute’s adoption to ensure NHTSA’s
compliance with congressional will. As positive political theorists ob-
serve, substantive statutory requirements coupled with evidentiary
and procedural requirements, “create pressures on [the] agenc[y] that
replicate the political pressures applied when the relevant legislation
was enacted,” working to “enhance the durability of the bargain
struck among members of the coalition.”129 So understood, hard look
review is designed to minimize agency infidelities to key principals,
minimizing the agent cost problem in administrative law.130 That is,
125. Id. at 43.
126. Id. at 56–57.
127. Id. at 54.
128. Id. at 55 (citing legislative history).
129. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 255 (1987).
130. See, e.g., Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505,
586–91 (1985) (characterizing hard look review as a reinforcement of agency fidelity to Con-
gress).
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hard look review serves loyalty interests by helping to hold agencies
accountable to key principals for agency decisions.131
For similar reasons, Professor Richard Nagareda urges hard look
review of settlements in mass tort cases. Professor Nagareda observes
two agent cost problems with mass tort settlements. First, private
counsel wield “sweeping power” through such agreements, without
necessarily claiming valid authority to represent the interests of every
member of the class.132 Second, as Judge Posner has observed, in the
class action context, “the negotiator on the plaintiffs’ side, that is, the
lawyer for the class, is potentially an unreliable agent of his princi-
pals.”133 To help guard against the accountability problems that these
agent costs create, Professor Nagareda urges that courts apply the
hard look test to approval of class action settlements in mass torts un-
der Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.134 As he states,
131. Some scholars argue that courts should view judicial review of measures enacted by
direct democratic means, such as voter initiative, more skeptically than those put into place via
ordinary legislation. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503, 1558–73 (1990) (arguing for a “hard judicial look” when challenges are raised “against
laws enacted by substitutive plebiscite”); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not
“Republican Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 41–45
(1993) (describing test for defining manageable “standards for initiative lawmaking within a re-
publican form of state government”); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Inter-
pretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 123–67 (1995) (exploring the inter-
pretation process used by courts in applying statutory law enacted through the initiative process
and describing the problems of intentionalist methodology in the search for “popular intent”).
Although this argument bears some analogy to my call for rigorous review of settlement—in the
sense that I am skeptical about the accountability of private ordering—I am not proposing that
settlement be reviewed more rigorously than other administrative actions that implement law or
policy, such as the adoption of rules, policy statements, or interpretations. I am only proposing
that arbitrary and capricious review extend to this sort of private ordering as well as to final
agency action otherwise subject to review.
132. Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 904
(1996).
133. Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1987); see
also Nagareda, supra note 132, at 908–14 (discussing the consequences of contingent fee ar-
rangements and franchise agreements within the context of the mass torts bar).
134.  Nagareda, supra note 132, at 946–52. Under Rule 23, trial courts require class action
settlements to be fair, adequate, and reasonable prior to their approval. See FED. R. CIV. P.
23(e) (“A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court . . . .”); see also Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1559–60 (5th Cir. 1984)
(noting the active role of a district court in the settlement of a Title VII consent decree case and
stating that the court will approve settlement if it is “fair, adequate and reasonable”); Weinber-
ger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly, J.) (recognizing that a “district court’s
disposition of a proposed class action settlement should be accorded considerable deference”).
For further discussion of how courts have struggled in implementing this standard, see Roger C.
Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An Introduction, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 811, 819–23 (1995).
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“It would be far more difficult for class counsel to advance their own
interests at the expense of the class if counsel knew that in order to
obtain judicial approval they must explain their decisions in light of
contrary information.”135 There may be some advantages to applying
the hard look standard in this context, although it is not exactly clear
what such a standard would entail in the context of evaluating a set-
tlement, where in many instances the policy issues are few.
State Farm sets the bar for modifications of adopted regulations
by agencies. As State Farm reminds, an agency cannot commit to re-
peal a rule without going through the notice and comment process
and providing reasons—apart from raw executive branch politics—for
a change in the agency’s position.136 The dissenters in State Farm, in-
cluding two current members of the Court (Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O’Connor), stated that a “change in administration
brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reason-
able basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and bene-
fits of its programs and regulations.”137 The State Farm majority, how-
ever, rejected the position that “substantial uncertainty” that a
regulation will accomplish its purpose is sufficient reason for re-
scinding a regulation.138 State Farm limits the nature of an agency’s re-
peal or modification mechanisms, encouraging the agency to use rea-
sons beyond political pressure in the executive branch.
At a minimum, as the APA provides, ex post review of settle-
ments, at the enforcement or final rules appeal stage, is necessary to
protect the public interest. But given agency opportunities for skirting
administrative procedure in the settlement process, ex post review is
not sufficient to protect the public interest. In contrast to class action
settlements, which are only approved to the extent that they are fair,
just, and reasonable,139 the judicial role in approving consent decrees
and other settlements has been more limited. In many cases outside
of the class action context, courts have been described as “rubber-
135. Nagareda, supra note 132, at 946.
136. State Farm requires an agency to explain the reasons for the change in its position, pur-
suant to the arbitrary and capricious test. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983). Of course, State Farm should not be viewed as a case that auto-
matically favors the initially adopted rules. State Farm merely requires an agency to explain the
basis for its regulations. Hastily enacted regulations will be more likely to face challenge under
the State Farm test. Hastily enacted rules, even under State Farm, may certainly be hastily re-
pealed.
137. Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
138. Id. at 52.
139. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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stamping” consent decrees or settlements.140 However, as case law es-
tablishes, “[a] judge is not obligated to approve any settlement that is
put forth by the parties.”141 Where “the interests of individuals and
organizations other than those approving the settlement may be im-
plicated[,] [t]he presence of these other interests prevents . . . the trial
court [] from taking a totally ‘hands-off’ attitude toward the settle-
ment reached.”142 Courts have held that “[s]ettlements are void
against public policy . . . if they directly contravene a state or federal
statute or policy.”143
Certainly, ex post review is based on a far more extensive record
than review ex ante—at the time of a settlement’s approval—thus
providing courts an opportunity to gauge the full process rather than
assess piecemeal a small corner of a policy decision, as courts may ex
ante. If all an agency faces is ex post review, however, there is a risk
of premature, even unknown or unknowable, agency commitment to
substantive policy positions that can influence the content of a final
rule without necessarily becoming a part of the rulemaking record.
Moreover, in some instances, settlement may never culminate in final
agency action, or an agency may adopt what are effectively interpre-
tive rules or policy statements in the course of settlement, without
necessarily taking these through APA procedures or subjecting them
to APA review.
Just as a glance into the rearview mirror will not alert the auto-
mobile driver to potential blind spots on the highway, a backward
glance at the merits of settlement will not always suffice to expose the
blind spots associated with rulemaking settlement. A direct glance at
the settlement’s merits and the circumstances surrounding it at the
time of initial approval of the settlement or stay of an agency’s action
also is necessary. For example, in approving stays of agency regula-
tory action pending review or implementation of a settlement under
the APA, assessment of the public interest serves to guard against the
140. See, e.g., Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29
B.C. L. REV. 291, 291 n.1 (1988) (defining the role of courts in administering consent judg-
ments).
141. In re Smith, 926 F.2d 1027, 1029 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2d, § 23.14 (1986)).
142. United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1980).
143. Smith, 926 F.2d at 1029; see also Atl. Co. v. Broughton, 146 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1944)
(“Though settlements in accord and satisfaction are favored in law, they may not be sanctioned
and enforced when they contravene and tend to nullify the letter and spirit of an Act of Con-
gress.”).
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use of stays to undermine the regulatory process.144 Even where a stay
is supported by the agency, independent judicial assessment of the
public interest in granting the stay serves an important role in ensur-
ing that stays do not undermine the regulatory process.
More broadly, ex ante review of a settlement’s merits guards
against the possibility that an agency will adopt a position in a settle-
ment without some consideration of contrary views among principals,
including principals such as Congress and interested stakeholders that
are not present on appeal but who may have commented previously
in the initial rulemaking. Ex ante review also would improve the
quality of private participation in rulemaking settlement, since private
parties will be less likely to view settlement opportunities as an occa-
sion for private bargaining with the agency. Ex ante review further
minimizes the risk of an agency’s wasting resources if a settlement
commits an agency to a course of action that later is rejected on ap-
peal. The APA does not expressly provide for ex ante review of set-
tlements and their terms outside of the context of judicial stays,145
suggesting that the textual support for such review is shaky. However,
because a court applying ex ante review already has jurisdiction to
hear the appeal over a previously adopted regulation, it is not contro-
versial as a procedural matter for the courts to apply the same stan-
dard in reviewing the settlements that it would apply in substantive
review of the challenged rule.146 The record for reviewing the settle-
ment presumably would include the full appellate record on appeal,
as well as any submissions by the agency and stakeholders in support
of the settlement.
144. Under the APA, judges reviewing agency action can issue “all necessary and appropri-
ate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights
pending conclusion of the review proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1994). In assessing the appropri-
ateness of § 705 stays, some courts have evaluated whether issuance of the stay is consistent with
the public interest. See Hamlin Testing Labs., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 337 F.2d
221, 222–23 (6th Cir. 1964) (weighing the public interest heavily in denying a stay); Associated
Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 283 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1960) (denying a stay because it was not estab-
lished that granting the stay will not be contrary to the public interest).
145. See supra note 144.
146. See Mark Seidenfeld, An Apology for Administrative Law in The Contracting State, 28
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 215, 236–37 (2001) (suggesting that courts review the enforcement settle-
ment process as part of the ongoing process of regulatory implementation, subjecting it to APA
standards of review). A consent decree must “further the objectives of the law upon which the
complaint was based.” Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 525 (1986). In the context of judicial review of regulations or enforcement proceedings un-
der the APA, that law includes the APA and its standards of review.
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Even with ex ante review of the merits of a settlement, an agency
still has broad authority to make concessions in the course of settle-
ments on appeal. One way for an agency to do so is through an inter-
pretative rule or policy statement, which agencies routinely adopt
without notice and comment rulemaking. An interpretation endorsed
in the course of a settlement agreement, however, ought to be subject
to the same challenges as an interpretive rule adopted outside of the
settlement context. Although the record for review may be a narrow
one, subjecting the interpretation to ex ante hard look review prior to
judicial approval of a settlement will create strong incentives for an
agency to provide a robust explanation for the interpretation.
In sum, ex post review alone will not be sufficient to protect loy-
alty values in rulemaking settlement but must be coupled with ex ante
review. Courts can apply this recommendation by extending the arbi-
trary and capricious test to settlement approval or to consent decrees.
Outside of the context of staying agency action, the statutory basis for
courts exercising such review, which the APA only provides for “fi-
nal” agency action, is not express, but such review has strong poten-
tial to hold rulemaking settlement to account and is consistent with
the procedural roles that courts play in reviewing agency regulations.
CONCLUSION
Private stakeholders see value in rulemaking settlement to the
extent that it can be used to bind an agency. The binding nature of
settlement thus works as an important incentive for private litigants
to engage in this strategy, rather than to litigate, when contesting an
agency regulation.147 It is important to note, however, that settlements
that bind the government can affect the public interest in ways that
ordinary civil settlements do not.
Since private stakeholder bargaining in rulemaking settlements
often takes place outside of the formal legal protections of adminis-
trative process, an agency may find it expedient to give short shrift to
the public interest in order to settle lawsuits. Courts and litigants
should not treat settlement of substantive challenges to rules as mere
private contracts. Nor should strong deference to agency interpreta-
tions necessarily be the norm. Such a judicial approach heavily favors
147. Of course, a stakeholder will face other process-oriented incentives for settling, in-
cluding reputation benefits that might benefit the stakeholder in other proceedings with the
agency.
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exit interests over other concerns such as voice and loyalty. Exit,
voice, and loyalty interests each must play a part in the evaluation of
settlements. Voice and loyalty interests, in particular, may be in ten-
sion at times, but this is the same tension with which courts struggle
elsewhere in defining participation for administrative law.148
Due to a principal-agent gap that fails to protect the public inter-
est in administrative agency concessions during settlement, some ex
ante judicial role in policing the public interest is appropriate. Simul-
taneously, courts must evaluate carefully participation in such settle-
ments, allowing broad collateral opportunities for challenge to ensure
that key stakeholder perspectives are not omitted. With a balanced
approach to monitoring participation and reviewing the merits of set-
tlements, courts can help avoid the potential for undermining the
public interest while also preserving incentives for private stakeholder
participation in settlements of rule appeals.
148. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 15, at 211–41 (addressing the tension between voice inter-
ests, which are associated with mass participation, and deliberation, a type of loyalty concern).
